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Abstract  
 
This paper considers the pressures on the British armed services to increase the participation of 
minority ethnic groups and assesses recent government policy on this issue. Limited progress 
has been made towards the realisation of current goals, which are framed largely in terms of the 
concept of ‘equal opportunities’. The authors argue that while the concept of diversity appears 
to provide a more sociologically well founded basis for future government strategy on this 
aspect of service personnel policy, there remain significant obstacles to effective 
implementation of practical measures.  These concern in particular the way in which the armed 
services relate to wider questions of British identity. Successfully increasing the participation 
of minority ethnic communities in the British armed services, we contend, entails developing a 
new framework for British identity and citizenship that cannot be accomplished by the armed 
services alone.  Rather it is a responsibility of both government and wider society as a whole.  
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Armed Services 
1. Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, human resource or ‘people’ issues have moved up the agenda of the 
British armed services. Of course, a focus on people has always been important, as armed forces 
can only be as effective as the personnel who work for them; yet, until recently, strategic and 
technological issues have tended to occupy centre stage.1  A key people issue in the UK is the 
increasing expectation - not least by government - that the armed services should ‘reflect’ society. 
One meaning of this phrase is that the social profile of the Services should correspond more 
closely with that of the wider population in terms of gender, sexual orientation, social class and 
ethnicity.  
 
This paper considers the pressures on the British armed services to increase the participation of 
minority ethnic groups and reviews recent government policy in this area. To date, its response has 
been framed largely in terms of the logic of ‘equal opportunities’ with, we note, only limited 
progress being made towards the realisation of current goals. We argue that this lack of progress 
may not be accidental and suggest that there may be good reasons for believing that current policy 
targets may be unreachable.  Against this background, we note that the concept of diversity is 
increasingly being invoked in policy discourses addressed to the representation of minority ethnic 
groups in the armed services.2  As will become clear, we argue that, in principle, this concept 
could provide a more sociologically well founded basis for future government thinking and 
practice. However, we suggest that a number of major issues would need to be addressed if a 
strategy based on this concept were to be implemented effectively. Some of these issues relate to 
the organisation and history of the British armed services.  Others, however, have to do with the 
nature of British identity more generally. We argue that the British armed services - a relatively 
small, all-volunteer force - cannot realistically be expected successfully to address the problem of 
increasing the participation of minority ethnic communities within their ranks without the prior 
development of a robust framework of ideas about how these broader identity issues are to be 
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tackled.3 Such a framework is first and foremost a responsibility of government and the wider 
society as a whole.  
 
This paper sets out the basis on which such a framework might be constructed. We should make it 
clear that the primary purpose of this paper is to explore some key conceptual issues concerning 
representation, equity, nationality and citizenship as they bear on the British context.  Whilst we 
are interested in the implications that our conceptual explorations have for policy, the aim of this 
paper is not to design detailed practical policy measures for the British armed forces.  Indeed, a 
key aspect of our discussion is our claim that both the armed services and British society more 
widely have some fundamental decisions to make about the shape of the British national project in 
the 21st Century.  The specificities of the British case are central to our discussion.  In particular, 
the essentially 'ethnicised' nature of traditional British (and English) conceptions of nationality and 
citizenship contrast markedly with societies like the United States with their more contractual 
constitutions and civic nationalisms.  Similarly, the relatively small, if growing, size of the British 
minority ethnic population and its near invisibility in the ranks of the armed services and other 
elite sectors of the British social life, make easy comparisons with societies like the United States 
problematic.  The relative success of the US armed forces in securing greater racial equity arose 
out of an assault on segregation and discrimination in an army in which large numbers of African-
Americans already served.4  In Britain, the problem is simultaneously to secure equity of 
representation and of treatment. 
 
2. Minority ethnic communities and the armed services: a story of under-representation. 
It is important at the outset to be clear about what is meant when British policy makers refer to 
‘minority ethnic groups’.  In Britain, ethnic difference is almost exclusively associated with an 
implicit division of the population into an ethnic ‘majority’ and a number of ethnic ‘minorities’.  
This perspective is a product of the pattern of migration to Britain since the Second World War, 
resulting in the growth of a population whose recent origins lie in the former British colonies in the 
Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean, Africa, and East Asia. These populations are commonly 
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referred to in popular culture and in public policy as ‘ethnic minorities’.  Two points about this 
terminology are significant. The first is that in order to qualify for designation as an ethnic 
minority, a category of people must exhibit a degree of ‘difference’ that is regarded as significant. 
Not every group having a distinctive culture and constituting a minority in the British population is 
normally included. For example, the large communities of people of Cypriot, Italian and Polish 
origin (to name but a few) to be found in many British cities are rarely so labelled.  Similarly, to 
refer to an earlier example, people of Irish descent, a significant proportion of the British 
population, are rarely defined in this way.5 In practice, it is a combination of visibility by skin 
colour and cultural values that marks off ‘ethnic minorities’ from the ‘majority’ population in 
Britain. This latter point has been highlighted both by domestic strife in British cities involving 
minority ethnic communities and, more recently by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
discussions of which have become entwined with existing debates on immigration and asylum 
seekers. After September 11, in particular, it is now possible to debate the nature of ‘Britishness’ 
and how to integrate minority cultural communities - not least those with Islamic roots - into the 
mainstream of British society in ways that were difficult if not impossible before.6   
 
The second point about the term ‘ethnic minorities’ is that, despite the implicit emphasis on 
difference, such groups are typically seen to have more in common with one another than with the 
‘majority’. Diversity among the groups so designated is thus downplayed while their purported 
differences from the rest of the population are exaggerated. This is not necessarily a conscious 
process; nor is it driven simply by those committed to explicitly racist, or otherwise exclusionary, 
political projects – such as far right political parties.  Even initiatives driven by a commitment to 
policies designed to address ethnic disadvantage and exclusion find it difficult to escape these 
assumptions.  Thus, for example, the question in the 1991 Census of Population designed to 
measure the ethnic diversity of the British population, and map differences of experience and 
opportunity, effectively reinforced the distinction between an undifferentiated ‘white’ population 
and a limited number of ‘ethnic minorities’.7 
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The pattern of under-representation of minority ethnic groups (thus understood) in the British 
armed services is well established. In 1998, as part of its Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the 
British government made the goal of increasing the participation of minority ethnic groups in the 
armed services an explicit feature of its policy.8  This policy has been driven by two sets of 
considerations.  These are what might be termed the ‘citizenship case’, on the one hand and, on the 
other, an argument based on instrumental, efficiency-based considerations: the ‘business case’.9 
The former rests on considerations of equity: that the participation of all members of society in its 
core public institutions is a moral and political priority because it symbolises what a decent, 
tolerant and inclusive society should be. By contrast, the business case relies on more hardnosed, 
material calculations. It claims that widening the recruitment pool to include more members of the 
minority ethnic communities would both increase the numbers of potential recruits and broaden the 
values and insights within the military, in turn adding to its intellectual capital.10  Furthermore, 
whether recruiting from the majority pool or from minority communities, there is also an 
assumption that the armed services will provide recruits with an opportunity for bettering 
themselves later on in life when their military careers have ended.11 The most recent data show a 
persistent gap between the social profile of the armed services and that of wider society, although 
there have been some recent modest increases in the participation of minority ethnic groups, not 
least in the British Army. In October 2001 (the date at which the most recent systematic data are 
available), when the overall percentage of minority ethnic groups in the wider population was said 
to be approximately 6 per cent 12, the percentage of Regular personnel in the UK armed services 
drawn from minority ethnic groups was 1.7 per cent overall (1.2 per cent for Officers and 1.8 per 
cent for Other Ranks).  This compares with the 1.00 per cent overall (1 per cent officers and 1 per 
cent Other Ranks) for April 1998.13 Within these already low levels of participation in the armed 
services, South Asian minority ethnic groups (a significant proportion of the UK minority ethnic 
population) are particularly under-represented among uniformed personnel. 
 
There are some interesting variations by individual service: the Royal Navy has increased minority 
ethnic representation from 0.7 per cent to 1 per cent overall (0.9 per cent to 1.1 per cent for 
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Officers and 0.7 per cent to 1.1 per cent Other Ranks). Meanwhile, the Royal Air Force has 
remained static or worse with figures of 1.2 per cent overall for 1998 (1.2 per cent for Officers and 
Other Ranks) and 1.1 per cent overall for October 2001 (1.3 per cent Officers and 1.0 per cent 
Other Ranks). The Army has made more significant gains with figures of 1 per cent overall for 
1998 (0.9 per cent Officers and 1.1 per cent Other Ranks) and 2.4 per cent overall for October 
2001 (1.2 per cent Officers and 2.5 per cent Other Ranks).14  
Table 1 about here 
The comparative data for the participation of women in the armed services are instructive. In 
percentage terms, their relative contribution has risen significantly (from 5.7 per cent in April 
1990, to about 8 per cent, with the latest figures, October 2001, showing 9.5 per cent of officers 
and 8.00 per cent Other Ranks overall). British service women provide a significant contribution to 
the overall participation of female military personnel in NATO countries, supplying 15.4 per cent 
of the total number of NATO women, with the US providing 69.4 per cent.15 In terms of female 
participation in national armed forces, the UK ranks in relative percentage terms after the United 
States (14 per cent) and Canada (11 per cent).16  
 
It should be noted that the number of women employed in the British armed services has remained 
stable for the past five years, (with a slight increase in numbers for the fifteen months up to 
October 2001). The ‘figures do not show sustained growth’ in comparison with, for example, the 
police service, ‘where the percentage of women is now about 35 per cent, having remained at 20-
25 per cent for a number of years.’17  Of course, women comprise some fifty one per cent of the 
population and their numbers would be expected to be higher than minority ethnic personnel 
especially with the recent elimination of many (but not all) of the formal exclusions to which they 
have been traditionally subject. Currently, female personnel are able to serve in 70 per cent of 
posts in the Army; 73 per cent of posts in the Naval Service; and 96 per cent of posts in the RAF.18 
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While government attempts to increase the participation of both women and minority ethnic 
groups in the armed services appear similar there are some significant differences in their 
underlying policy assumptions. Thus with regard to the employment of women,  
 
The three Services are wholly committed to maximising opportunity for women in the 
Armed Forces, except where this would damage combat effectiveness…19 
 
Women's roles, then, are discussed in terms of the maximisation of opportunity.  There is no 
suggestion that proportional representation is a goal.  By contrast, minority ethnic groups are 
discussed in the following terms: 
 
We are determined that the Armed Forces should better reflect the ethnic composition of 
the British population. Currently some 6% of the general population are from ethnic 
minority backgrounds, but they make up just 1% of the Services. This must not continue. 
We have set a goal of attracting 2% of new recruits this year from ethnic minority 
communities for each Service. We want that goal to increase by 1% each year so that, 
eventually, the composition of our Armed Forces reflects that of the population as a 
whole.20 
 
Here the emphasis is clearly on proportionality of representation and the implication is clear: its 
absence is itself evidence of continuing disadvantage or unfairness. How do we account for this 
divergence in policy assumptions? To understand the issues involved we must examine the 
discourse of equal opportunities as it has developed in the UK.  
 
3. Thinking through equal opportunities in the UK: two dilemmas 
In debates about equal opportunities in Britain, two recurrent dilemmas are especially relevant to 
the contemporary armed services.21 The first is the question of whether the objective of policy 
should be to secure equality of opportunity or equality of outcome. The dominant emphasis in 
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Britain has been on equality of opportunity with a focus on procedure characteristic of what has 
become known as the ‘liberal’ model of equal opportunities.22 In this view, equality can be 
achieved if the skills and qualities of individuals (assumed to be randomly distributed in the 
population) can be matched more precisely to the functional requirements of occupational roles.  
Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the bureaucratic regulation of recruitment and selection 
systems designed to remove unfair, and inefficient, barriers to the achievement of that aim.23  The 
individualist emphasis of the liberal model also means that equality of opportunity is 
characteristically structured in terms of the opportunity for people, whether men or women and of 
whatever ethnicity, to be treated as if they were the same.  No explicit account is taken of the 
possibility that there may be systematic differences between people, which have their origins in 
group characteristics. 
 
In practice, however, liberal proceduralist policies have frequently been judged in terms of 
standards that are, in principle, the province of an outcomes-centred approach – what has been 
termed the ‘radical model’.24 In its extreme form, such a perspective would envisage positive 
discrimination in favour of under-represented groups, a practice that remains unlawful in Britain.  
However, a good deal of orthodox equal opportunities discourse involves making comparisons 
between groups in terms of the notion of proportionality of representation.  Hence the stress on 
monitoring, measurement and intervention in terms of positive action even if, as research evidence 
suggests, these have by no means been widespread even among organisations apparently 
committed to equal opportunities.25 We are faced then with a paradox: the liberal model’s 
emphasis on opportunity is frequently combined with a concern with outcomes while, in practice, 
the measures necessary to deliver greater equity in outcomes are not systematically pursued. 
 
The second dilemma concerns the respective merits of generic or targeted policies. There is 
widespread recognition that the precise disadvantages experienced by different, marginalized and 
excluded groups vary in character and degree. Nevertheless, with limited exceptions, equal 
opportunities policies in both the private and public sectors in Britain have tended to take a generic 
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form.  Where differences in the needs of particular groups have been recognised this has tended to 
be reflected in targeted positive action provisions.26 This contrast is mirrored at government policy 
level.  Despite significant differences in the legislative provisions regarding sex, race and, more 
recently, disability discrimination, official Department of Employment (now Department for Work 
and Pensions) advice on the development of equal opportunities policies has generally focused on 
generic recommendations.27  While there are often practical reasons for the adoption of generic 
policies, the choice is often dictated by the more or less explicit embracing by policy makers of the 
liberal conception of equal opportunities. By contrast, those championing the claims of women, 
minority ethnic groups and, more recently, those with disabilities (who also wish to challenge what 
they perceive as illegitimate exclusionary practices by the armed services) are more likely to stress 
the distinctive needs and characteristics of these groups.  Such demands are counterposed to the 
ultimately liberal, individualist focus of generic policies and have helped to ensure the survival of 
a group-centred equality agenda.  This, in turn, has led to demands for more effective monitoring 
and measurement, and has bolstered arguments for targeting and other forms of positive action.  
Critically, these features highlight the weaknesses of approaches to equal opportunities that 
concentrate on technical or administrative solutions and they signal the ultimately political 
character of equal opportunities as an issue for excluded and marginalized groups. 
 
Despite the dominance of generic approaches to policy, however, it is by no means the case that, in 
practice, such policies have pursued the needs of all groups with equal vigour. Jewson et al., for 
example, identify a number of cases where equal opportunities for women have been, in practice, 
higher up the agenda than the needs of minority ethnic groups.28  In other cases, differences of 
emphasis are not difficult to discern – most notably in what is frequently not said – within the 
framework of ostensibly generic policies. For example, the question of gender equality in 
occupations traditionally dominated by women is rarely, if ever, constructed in terms of the 
problem of achieving a proportional representation of men.  Instead, the focus is more usually on 
the disproportionate numbers of men in senior positions, relative to their presence in the profession 
as a whole.29  Implicit in this approach is a range of largely unspoken, culturally bounded, 
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assumptions about occupational choice.  As we shall see, presently, the contrast with the way 
equity for minority ethnic groups is characteristically conceived is plain and this raises some 
difficult questions about how we should conceptualise occupational choice and constraint 
 
4. Increasing the participation of minority ethnic groups in the armed services: an achievable 
goal? 
In the context of the dominance of generic approaches, it is noteworthy that, as we indicated 
earlier, the British armed services have embraced explicitly different policy agendas in respect of 
gender and race equality. While the equation of representation with proportionality is so 
commonplace in the equal opportunities literature as to amount to orthodoxy, the explicit contrast 
drawn in MOD policy between the treatment of ethnic and gender equality represents a rare 
exception in a British context.  This contrast implicitly invokes two different senses of 
‘representativeness’: the statistical (i.e. proportional representation) and the delegative, where 
members of groups are represented in the ranks of any profession by some of their members but 
this does not require proportional representation.30 Such an approach is vulnerable to charges of 
‘tokenism,’ as was recognised in the development of schemes for the integration of women in the 
ships of the Royal Navy, and by those who perceive it as a major issue should the exclusion of 
women from combat arms in ground forces be lifted.31 
 
It is important to ask, given this contrast, whether the goal of statistical representation of minority 
ethnic groups is achievable even if resources continue to be allocated to the achievement of targets 
to close the gap between the armed services and society on this issue.32 In our view, there is a real 
danger that the commitment to 'representativeness' (as expressed in SDR) is a promise that cannot 
be delivered.   
 
A key difficulty with which the armed services have to contend is that the gross category  'ethnic 
minority' takes no account of the different socio-demographic profiles, levels of social mobility, 
educational attainment and cultural traditions of the very diverse groups that make up Britain's 
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minority ethnic population.  It is quite conceivable that the overall target of increasing minority 
ethnic participation to a level commensurate with the proportion of the population classified as 
'ethnic minority' could be reached without proportionality being achieved for some of the 
communities involved.  Were this to be the case, the credibility of the armed services' commitment 
to equal opportunities might be challenged, particularly if the consequent over-representation of 
some groups was reflected in differential casualty rates.  
 
Of critical importance is the probability that members of different groups may have differential 
propensities to select particular occupations or to aspire to particular careers.  Given that we know 
that the 'white' population has not had a uniform propensity to select the armed forces as a career, 
we should not be surprised if similar differentials were to be found among other groups; although 
it must be said that what we know about the attitudes and aspirations of different minority ethnic 
communities concerning the armed services as a career continues to rest more on military 
recruiters’ practical judgements and anecdote rather than systematic research.33 Moreover, in order 
to know that completely proportional representation was unattainable  - perhaps even undesired  - 
by the groups concerned, the armed services would have to be confident that potential recruits 
were exercising genuinely unconstrained choices.  This would mean ensuring that they had a 
demonstrably effective programme for promoting opportunities and eliminating discriminatory 
decision-making and other practices.  
 
Nevertheless, until recently, it has been commonplace to assume that the labour market experience 
of members of minority ethnic groups has been universally one of disadvantage and exclusion.  
Without in any way minimising the weight of evidence that points in this direction it is important 
to note the complexity in the ways in which the rapid economic change of the 1980s and early 
1990s has affected existing patterns of advantage and disadvantage in the labour market.  An 
increasing number of studies in the early 1990s had already begun to suggest that members of 
some groups were experiencing significant upward occupational mobility.34  The growth of a 
middle class of professional and managerial workers in some minority ethnic communities, and the 
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entry of these groups into the service sector, has led some to suggest that there is a developing 
convergence in the class structures of minority ethnic groups towards that of the majority white 
population.35  These trends have been confirmed by the most recent analyses of data for the late 
1990s, which suggest that, in terms of economic activity, unemployment and job levels, even some 
of the previously most disadvantaged groups, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, have continued to close 
the gap with whites.36 
 
We should note that the patterns are complex, particularly in relation to differences between men 
and women, and we should avoid jumping to too many conclusions about future patterns of 
minority ethnic disadvantage. There remain significant differences between members of different 
ethnic groups, with those of Caribbean descent in particular apparently still lagging behind.  
Moreover, there are marked regional variations with significant local pockets of labour market 
disadvantage and exclusion affecting even those groups apparently experiencing upward mobility. 
We should also remember that upward mobility is quite compatible with occupational segregation, 
and with continuing discrimination. Moreover, there may there be important differences of level 
within broad occupational categories, such as those between senior and middle management. 
 
What this evidence does point to, however, is a need to place any discussion of the attractiveness 
to potential minority ethnic recruits of a career in the armed services in the context of a recognition 
that the range of other opportunities open to them is also changing.  The evidence about 
educational attainment further reinforces this point. It is clear that members of minority ethnic 
groups are more likely to remain in full-time education after the age of 16 than are their white 
counterparts—a finding which holds both for young men and young women.37 Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that this is a pattern of relatively longstanding, dating back at least to the 
beginning of the 1980s.38 In addition, it appears that, in general, minority ethnic groups are over-
represented in higher education relative to their presence in the population as a whole, although 
this gross observation conceals some important variations.39 
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There are a number of potential explanations for this pattern of post-16 educational participation. 
However, Modood has argued that it is important not to under-estimate the strength of what he 
calls ‘ethnic minorities’ drive for qualifications’.40  He attributes this to a strong motivation for 
economic betterment in which education is seen to play a key part. In addition, he suggests that 
qualifications are seen as a means to circumvent persistent labour market discrimination. The 
results of the fourth Policy Studies Institute (PSI) survey of ethnic minorities41 concerning 
qualification levels add further to this picture of progress.42  Although the patterns are complex 
they appear to confirm Modood’s observations about the progress made by minority ethnic groups 
relative to whites.43 Minority ethnic young women, in particular, have made great strides in 
educational attainment over a relatively short time span.   
 
Any analysis of the potential attractiveness of a military career must be placed in this broader 
context.  Indeed, some recent survey evidence about the attitudes of minorities of Pakistani 
Muslim descent in Britain lends weight to this line of argument.  When questioned about the 
attractiveness of a military career, respondents in the survey cited concerns about racism as the 
major issue accounting for their lack of interest.  Significantly, however, the authors also found 
evidence of more generalised concerns about the nature of a military career as well as tendency to 
prioritise further and higher education over enlistment in what was often seen as low status 
occupation.44  All the above data lend weight to the possibility that, even with effective equal 
opportunities policies and practices in place, differential career choices by members of different 
minority ethnic groups might well make the aims expressed in the SDR unattainable.  Where 
would that leave the ‘citizenship’ and ‘business’ cases for equal opportunities, and what would be 
the implications for the expressed policy goal of the armed forces representing wider society? 
 
If proportional representation proved to be unattainable (or unacceptable) perhaps delegative 
representation would offer a more promising way forward. This would entail the armed forces 
becoming more representative of society in so far as they recruited personnel from a wider range 
of groups in society without statistical proportionality being achieved. Although, as we noted 
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earlier, this strategy would be open to the charge of ‘tokenism,’ it does resonate with some of 
aspects of the discourse of diversity, which is increasingly replacing or augmenting traditional 
‘equal opportunities’ discourse in many civilian equal opportunities circles in the UK.45  
Moreover, as we noted at the outset, it is also a term increasingly invoked in policy discussions 
concerning the representativeness of the armed services, even if it is not always clear that those 
deploying it have fully grasped its nuances.   
 
Is it possible that embracing the concept of diversity could provide a way out of the policy 
dilemmas we have identified? Might it provide a way of legitimising the pursuit of delegative 
representation, and hence of recognising and exploiting ethnic and other differences in 
occupational aspirations rather than dismissing them as simply an artefact of ignorance or 
exclusion? 
 
5. The armed services and representing society: a strategy based on diversity 
According to its proponents, the concept of diversity means that people are valued precisely 
because of their differences.46 It assumes that different people will bring a variety of perspectives 
to an organization and that, through the contribution of these diverse viewpoints, the most 
innovative and effective solutions will be generated. Since it is also committed to using fully the 
talents of individuals, allowing them to rise to the limit of their abilities, the diversity model is said 
simultaneously to address individual needs while enhancing the capacity of organisations to 
mobilise human resources and respond to unpredictable environments.   
 
These claims resonate directly with both the citizenship and business cases for improving the equal 
opportunities performance of the armed services. On the one hand, tapping the pool of labour 
represented by minority ethnic communities is justified on the ground that the armed services 
would benefit from the diversity of skills and backgrounds that a broader based entry would 
produce. With the need for more intelligent and flexible service personnel likely to increase rather 
than decrease due to developments such as new technologies and more complex, politically 
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sensitive, missions it is held that such diversity is likely to prove an advantage in future years.47  
At the same time valuing diversity will provide the opportunities to realise the SDR's commitment 
to developing a personnel strategy that could: 
 
enable individuals to realise their full potential during their service, provide equality of 
opportunity irrespective of race, gender or religion, and assist them to prepare for 
subsequent careers…48 
 
For the British armed services, the utility of the concept of diversity, then, would appear to lie in 
its potential to transcend the difficulties associated with the idea of proportionality and to 
legitimise a delegative sense of representativeness. Yet it is by no means clear that diversity is a 
straightforward concept for military organisations in general, and the UK armed forces in 
particular, to embrace.  Discipline, authority and conformity are central to the social integration of 
military units and organisations.  They are key aspects of the notions of comradeship and esprit de 
corps that are core components of military self-image and organisation.  These characteristics of 
military organisations tend, in principle, to give rise to problems when confronted with difference 
– a fact that may help to explain some of the difficulties they have encountered with the integration 
of female, gay and related ‘others’.49  
 
Traditionally, the UK armed services have been able to incorporate certain kinds of ethnic and 
national differences into a broader, British and imperial identity.  An example is the role played by 
the sub-state national communities of Wales, Ireland and, especially, Scotland in the development 
of the military and its role in the construction, policing and dismantling of empire.50 It is difficult 
to exaggerate the impact of empire on the culture of the armed services, especially the Army and 
Royal Navy.  In the case of the British Army, it is symbolised by the continued recruitment of 
Gurkhas into the Army. This originated in a settlement between Nepal and Britain, and the use of 
British officered Gurkha regiments for policing the Empire (although the importance of Gurkha 
forces continues as much for reasons of recruitment shortages in Britain as from the requirements 
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of administering the remaining remnants of empire).51 The possibility of recruiting personnel to 
the armed forces from outside the United Kingdom (another important example is Eire) reflects the 
evolution of the UK’s laws relating to citizenship and nationality since the dismantling of the 
British Empire after the Second World War and the subsequent formation of the Commonwealth.52 
In contrast with the position of the longer established national communities at the core of British 
history, and that of the Gurkhas, the situation has been rather different for many of Britain’s 
contemporary minority ethnic populations. This is due not least to their position as visible 
minorities, marking them out as different from their white peers – whether for reasons of biology, 
culture or history – in the context of the distinctive polarities of British conceptions of ethnicity 
discussed above.   
 
This perspective on ethnic difference poses particular problems for the relationship between 
citizenship and nationality in a British context, and in turn affects the ways in which the armed 
services can operate.  This is because of the way in which both 'Englishness' and 'Britishness' have 
been represented as uniquely long-standing and primordial attachments.53 The significance of this 
appeal to historical continuity is greatly heightened when we consider the fact that all armed 
services tend to place a high value on tradition and history. In the case of the British armed 
services, this emphasis on history has a particular significance since much of the military history of 
the Britain over the last two centuries or so is the history of colonial involvement.  Many of the 
campaigns fought by the British armed services were either against colonised peoples or to protect 
imperial territory from other colonial powers.  Thus the recent forebears of many of Britain's 
citizens who are not white were either enemies or colonial subjects.  In these circumstances, it may 
be difficult to view their descendants as co-nationals – whatever their formal citizenship – because 
they lack both the common origins and the ethnic homogeneity which the British national myth, 
with its claims to a uniquely long history, requires. We do not know enough about how minority 
ethnic communities view the armed services or the extent to which they consider the military as a 
prospective career.54 However, there is evidence about attitudes to the military in the population as 
a whole. Reports suggest that  ‘[w]hen asked what makes them proud, after their families and 
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nationality, British people opted for the more traditional British institutions such as the Royal 
Family and the Armed Forces’.55 
 
6. The armed services and representing 21st century Britain 
The burden of history and tradition that we described above creates a situation in which the armed 
services are seen, and to some extent see themselves, as symbolically representative of a political 
community that is being superseded by a much more ethnically diverse Britain. One way of 
addressing this might be to seek explicitly to recover the historical contribution of the forebears of 
Britain's minority ethnic citizens to its military history, through a much more visible public 
celebration of their contribution to past military successes, for example in both World Wars of the 
twentieth century.  During 2000, for example, a travelling exhibition of photographs, supported by 
pages on the MOD website, attempted to convey this message through the slogan We Were There56 
Even if pursued with commitment, however, such a strategy is not without its dangers. Recovering 
the contribution of the forebears of Britain’s minority ethnic citizens to its imperial history could 
prove something of a double-edged weapon because that history has a dimension of exploitation 
and exclusion.  Traditional patterns of social exclusion have, from the standpoint of the more 
ancient national communities comprising the UK, constituted a restricted form of diversity within 
an imperial British identity, which has lasted longer than the formal identity of the empire itself. In 
this context, from the perspective of minority ethnic communities, the armed services could be 
seen as quintessentially socially exclusive organisations – white, male and class based in which 
minority ethnic groups were conditionally included as servants or the equivalent or as hired 
imperial warriors (as we indicated earlier in the paradigm case of the Gurkhas).57  Drawing 
attention to the fact the We Were There could as easily stir painful memories as stimulate a desire 
to recover an ancestral patriotic commitment.  The dangers of such a perception would be greatly 
strengthened if, as is possible on current trends, any success in recruitment drives were to have 
differential success among different minority ethnic communities.  It is not difficult to envisage an 
eventual over-representation of those from the ‘black’ (rather than Asian) groups with all the 
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potential this could have for differential casualty rates producing debates somewhat resonant of the 
US experience during and after the Vietnam War.58 
 
All of this suggests that pursuing a strategy based on the concept of diversity could offer a solution 
to current, and possible future, policy dilemmas for the armed services only if it were connected 
with a much more explicit acceptance of the diversity of the wider political community.  This 
would require a more fundamental reassessment of what it meant to be British in the 21st century 
together with a more refined assessment of what would be entailed in being representative of such 
a nation.  However, herein lies another dilemma because the character and shape of that diversity 
is becoming less clear. 
 
As we saw above, the evidence on occupational and social mobility suggests that conventional 
categories underplay ethnic diversity both in terms of range and the patterning of change in 
experience.  They also fail to capture in any precise way, the subtleties of individual and collective 
identities: these are more dynamic and complex than conventional British conceptions of ethnic 
difference allow, and there is evidence that significant processes are afoot which are increasingly 
challenging many taken for granted assumptions about ethnic, and for that matter national, 
identities.  Nor are these processes confined to the identities of Britain’s minority ethnic citizens. 
 
Commentators have noted how the process of political devolution within the United Kingdom is 
leading to a reinvigoration of longstanding national identities among both the Scots and the Welsh.  
Hand in hand with devolution is a growing regional agenda, at both national and EU levels, which 
has the potential to reawaken regional identities, which have long appeared dormant.  An 
interesting by-product of these developments has been the way in which Englishness as an identity 
has been increasingly posed as a question for public debate.59  As the dominant national group in 
Britain, it was not necessary, until recently, for most English people to reflect upon their 
relationship with English or British identities.  With the increasing assertiveness of other national 
identities within Britain, however, the English are being forced to confront the question of what 
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exactly marks them off from others, although so long as English nationalism remains relatively 
quiescent (in part precisely because of its dominance within the UK) recurrent talk of the ‘break-
up’ of Britain seems overdrawn.60 
 
Interestingly, to ask the question ‘Who are the English or British?’ appears to be a novelty only if 
we lack an historical perspective. Linda Colley has argued that the British nation was invented in 
the wake of the 1707 Act of Union.  It was forged as a national identity in and through a series of 
conflicts, notably with France, over a period of about a century and a half.  So successful was this 
process that, until brought into question by recent developments, the existence of a British national 
identity was rarely, if ever, challenged.  Yet it was quintessentially a political project in which a 
new set of essentially ethnic boundaries was consciously erected and celebrated.61 
 
The instrumental character of this process draws our attention to the fact that current attempts to 
rediscover some primordial essence of an English identity are fundamentally misplaced.  As Colin 
Kidd has shown, in the 17th Century there were at least eight versions of the English story – all of 
them related to different political projects ranging from Royalism to Leveller radicalism.62 A 
common problem for all of them was how to weave the diverse histories of the various groups out 
of which England had emerged, into a coherent national story.  It was not an easy task.  As late as 
1867, The Times noted: 
 
...there is hardly such a thing as a pure Englishman in this island.  In place of the rather 
vulgarised and very inaccurate phrase, Anglo-Saxon, our national denomination, to be 
strictly correct, would be a composite of a dozen national titles...63 
 
If the question of what constitutes a British or English identity is not new, it is no less real for 
those who find it necessary to confront them at the beginning of the 21st century. Given the 
confluence of the above two sets of debates about nationality and ethnic difference, the consequent 
general questioning about British identity opens the way for a more nuanced understanding of 
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ethnic diversity. However, it may also lead to defensiveness about identities thought to be under 
threat. In this connection, some have argued that, until recently, it has been difficult to celebrate 
English identity in the educational curriculum because the ideology of some versions of 
multiculturalism has, in its attempts to celebrate non-English cultures and remove any sense of the 
superiority of one culture over another, sometimes regarded any attempts to praise the ‘host 
culture’ as racist or exclusionary.64 
 
Such a nuanced appreciation of ethnic diversity would need to be based on an overarching 
narrative for British national identity, debates over which are becoming more significant. This 
narrative would recognise the distinctive contributions of the different ethnic communities that 
comprise modern Britain while at the same time highlighting a set of values to which all of its 
citizens need to subscribe.65 Such civic values are rooted in the history of the country – a history 
that while having a dimension of imperialism, domination, exclusion and exploitation also has one 
characterised by liberty, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and tolerance – precisely the 
values that multiculturalism has, in practice, frequently failed to recognise in sometimes one-sided 
accounts of English identity. The more long established national communities at the core of what 
is now a more ethnically diverse Britain have developed these values. Indeed, both in the past (as 
with Jewish and other immigrant populations) and now, such values provide some of the key 
attractions for those who wish to escape poverty and oppression in other parts of the world. As 
many members of the armed services themselves claim: such values as decency, tolerance, and fair 
play lie at the heart of British military culture, indicating that those who paint the history of the 
armed services solely in the colours of imperial exploitation have missed the complexities 
involved. Thus in connecting themselves with the narrative we have outlined the armed services 
need not envisage as radical a reform of their traditional culture as some of their more hostile 
critics might wish to suggest. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The British armed services have a well-established pattern of under-representation of minority 
ethnic citizens, which current government policy is seeking to reverse. One of the difficulties with 
this policy is that it is underpinned by a concept of representativeness that has not been fully 
thought through. As a result, it is quite possible that even with the commitment of further resources 
to the setting and achieving of recruitment targets for minority ethnic citizens, the goal of closing 
the gap between this aspect of the social profile of the armed services and wider British society 
will not be achieved.  We have suggested that, instead of relying on a concept of statistical or 
proportional representation, the armed services would be better served by an approach based on 
delegative representation.  This, in turn, might be harnessed to the current enthusiasm in Britain for 
invoking the discourse of diversity when issues of equity and representation are at stake. This 
approach would, in principle, be able to take advantage of recent developments in the nature of 
national and ethnic differences within the United Kingdom and begin to address the citizenship 
case for greater equity, albeit in a more sophisticated way than is characteristically enshrined in 
equal opportunities orthodoxy in the UK.  It would not, however, offer a solution to all the armed 
forces’ practical problems.  This is because, while achieving statistical representativeness would 
directly address the business case related to problems of recruitment and retention, delegative 
representativeness (or diversity) clearly would not. 
 
Does this mean that the business and citizenship cases for equity are at such fundamental odds that 
the only solution is to choose between them?  We suggest not, but only if the business case is 
conceived more widely than in terms of recruitment and retention.  In other walks of life in the UK 
– notably those with a public service dimension – business cases are increasing constructed on the 
basis of service delivery criteria.  In other words, in such settings, a key operational argument for 
greater equity is the need to serve the needs of an increasingly ethnically diverse population or 
client group.  This has been a central argument underpinning recent initiatives in the British 
National Health Service, for example.66  Clearly, such arguments are more easily made and 
comprehended in those aspects of service where personal care is being delivered.  Given what we 
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have said about the changing parameters of national and ethnic identities in Britain, it is not 
difficult to see how parallel arguments, fusing the citizenship and business cases, could be 
constructed for the armed services. 
 
Critically, however, we also claim that this aspect of military personnel policy cannot be 
developed successfully in isolation from a broader political project that is focused on the question 
of British national identity.  It will not be easy to develop a narrative for British national identity 
for the twenty-first century, which we argue is a necessary basis for policy on the participation of 
minority ethnic communities in the British armed services.  One difficulty is that this narrative 
could become merely a restatement of a traditional assimilationist or integrationist agenda, one that 
does not do justice to the complexity of minority ethnic identities or indeed of the identities of the 
more long-standing communities within the UK. Such a traditional agenda would be ill attuned to 
the real ethnic diversity of modern Britain, and constantly be wrong footed by its dynamism as the 
21st Century unfolds. There are also some serious issues of timing and responsibility.  It is one 
thing to ask the armed services to construct a post-imperial identity, which all members of modern 
Britain could aspire to join.  It is quite another to ask them to develop this in isolation from and 
before government and society as a whole takes the lead in developing the broader framework in 
which this military project can be developed.   
 
This is, emphatically, not an argument for inaction on the part of the armed services.  Nothing in 
this paper should give comfort to those who, for whatever reason, would prefer that the armed 
services be allowed to duck responsibility for their own recruitment and employment policies and 
practices.  Continued progress, however limited, in increasing the numbers of minority ethnic 
recruits, at all levels and in all arms, is arguably essential to sustaining the armed forces’ 
legitimacy claims in relation to civil society as a whole.  Our discussion is, however, intended to 
highlight the fact that practical problems in delivering fully on current commitments are in part a 
product of real conceptual dilemmas surrounding notions of representation, identity and diversity.  
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These are issues that bear not only on the armed services but also on British society as a whole.  It 
is ultimately at the national level that they will have to be resolved. 
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Table 1: Minority ethnic participation in the British armed forces: 
 Regular 
personnel
Officers Other 
Ranks
Royal Navy 
(Off/OR)
Royal Air 
Force 
(Off//OR)
Army (Off/OR)  
    
 
1998 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 (0.9/0.7) 1.2 (1.2/1.2) 1.0 (0.9/1.1) 
 
2001 1.7 1.2 1.8 1.0 (1.1/1.1) 1.1 (1.3/1.0) 2.4 (1.2/2.5) 
 
 
Source: Defence Analytical Services Agency, 2001 
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UK.  Interestingly it is the Welsh who are most positive about the Armed Forces (91%), along with people 
aged over 65 (91%), over half of whom are extremely proud. Finally, ‘of the institutions that respondents 
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said they were proud and ashamed of, the survey asked them to select their top three. The importance of the 
family (80%) far outranked anything else and although nationality (40%) came second, it scored only half as 
much as family. Armed Forces (16%) came third. Public transport (34%), the government (27%) and the 
NHS (18%) were ranked in the top three of which the nation is most ashamed. (See Nationwide Building 
Society Survey http://www.nationwide.co.uk/mediacentre/PressRelease.asp?ID=329)  Furthermore, 
according to recent poll data, the armed services rate quite highly in terms of the degree to which they attract 
the confidence of the general public. For example, in a survey of parents’ attitudes towards the examination 
system in British education, 84 per cent of ‘have "a great deal" or "a fair amount" of confidence in the exam 
system - more than those who have confidence in the armed forces (81%), the police (77%) and the legal 
system (60%).’ Yet the figure of 81 per cent is quite high and the contrast with the legal system is 
significant. http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/edexcel.shtml.  As for the issue of the armed forces as a 
prospective career, In a survey of 10-16 year old school children in England and Wales in 1996, 1998 and 
2001, MORI found that while an average of 13 per cent placed Army/Navy as a preferred choice of career 
(the other most desired categories were professional sport (18) vet (15) law (15) teacher (13), police (9). 
However, Army/Navy rated highly in the two occupations they would least like to do  (19) followed by 
dentistry (17) in 1996, yet with this figure rising significantly to 32 per cent in 2001. There are no data on 
breakdown by gender or minority ethnic communities, although  ‘the data are weighted by age, sex and 
region to Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) and Welsh Office data.’  
http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/emta-topline.shtml.  The breakdown by gender on some of the questions 
asked, e.g. knowledge of occupations such as engineering, are at 
http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/emta.shtml  
56 See the Website version at: http://www.mod.uk/wewerethere/  - accessed 22 March, 2002 
57 In fact, the armed services are far less class based than they once were and less than the public often 
thinks. The great majority of Sandhurst cadets, for example, now come from State Schools.  This is not to 
deny the persistence of social exclusion in the more traditional regiments such as the Cavalry. See R G L 
Von Zugbach and M Ishaq, “Officer Recruitment: The Decline in Social Eliteness in the Senior Ranks of the 
British Army”, in British Army and Society, ed. H. Strachan (London andPortland OR. , Cass 2000), 75-86. 
On class and the armed forces see also Eric Joyce, Armed Forces and the Man – Renewing the Armed 
Services, (Fabian Society 1997). 
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58 There is debate in the literature on the extent to which black Americans were over represented in the 
casualties of the Vietnam War. Moskos and Sibley Butler regard this as a myth.  SeeC C Moskos and J 
Sibley Butler, All that We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration, The Army Way, (New York, 
NY: Twentieth Century Fund Book, Basic Books, Harper Collins, 1996): 8-10.  D R Segal, however, argues 
that during the Vietnam War, ‘for the first time in the twentieth century, rather than being underrepresented 
or excluded from combat, blacks were more likely to be drafted, to be sent to Vietnam, to serve in high-risk 
combat units and to be killed or wounded in action’.  See D R Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship 
and Military Manpower Policy, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, , 1989), 110, citing M 
Binkin, M Eitelberg with A J Schexnider and M M Smith, Blacks in the Military, (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1982), 32.  The difference in interpretation may depend on a number of issues 
including, whether one refers to the period of the war as a whole or particular years, and whether one is 
referring to Army casualties or military casualties overall. Thus, while blacks were over represented in the 
Army’s combat arms, these arms were underrepresented in the overall casualties, where aviators from Army 
Navy and Air force (which included few blacks) were over-represented.  All that having been said, African-
Americans are over represented in the Army relative to their proportion of the wider population. However, 
they are more over represented in the combat support and combat service support branches than in the 
combat arms. If one compares African-American combat units with support units, African-American are 
underrepresented in the combat arms. However, if one compares African-American combat troops with the 
African-American military age population of the United States, they are over represented.  Black 
representation in combat units has been declining, and they are virtually absent from Special Forces, and are 
underrepresented in the officer corps. This may raise some questions about the idea that the military is an 
excellent example of an institution where blacks routinely give orders to whites, as blacks tend to be 
employed in the lower reaches of the management structure.  In making these points, the authors would like 
to acknowledge and are grateful for personal communications from both Professors Moskos and Segal. 
59 See D. McCrone, and R. Kiely, “‘Nationalism and Citizenship”, Sociology, 34, 1 (February 2000): 19-34 
60 V. Bogdanor,  “Shouting ‘Britain’ from the back,” Times Literary Supplement, (February 8, 2002): 28-29. 
61 Colley, Britons  
62 C. Kidd, British identities before nationalism: ethnicity and nationhood in the Atlantic world, 1600-1800, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
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63 Quoted in J. Walvin, Passage to Britain: immigration in British history and politics, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin in association with Belitha Press, 1984), 19. 
64 Routes of Racism, by Roger Hewitt, (Trentham Books, produced jointly for the International Centre for 
Intercultural Studies, Institute of Education, London and Greenwich Council's Central Racial Equality Unit 
and Greenwich Youth Service, 1996). See also I. A. MacDonald, Murder in the playground: the Burnage 
report. Report of the Macdonald Inquiry into racism and racial violence in Manchester schools (London: 
Longsight, 1989). For alternative views on the inadequacy of multicultural education see: D. Gillborn, 
‘Race’, Ethnicity and Education, (London, Unwin Hyman, 1990); D. Gillborn, Racism and Antiracism in 
Real Schools, (Buckingham, Open University Press, 1995); and S. Tomlinson, Multicultural Education in 
White Schools, (London, Batsford, 1990). For a detailed discussion of competing versions of 
multiculturalism and anti-racism see S. May (ed.), Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking multicultural and 
antiracist education, (London, Falmer Press, 1999). 
65 These values would have to involve rather more than the following suggestion: ‘…fortunately the test for 
Britishness is a perfectly simple one. It consists in wishing to continue to be represented in the United 
Kingdom Parliament at Westminster and voting for parties which favour such continued representation.’ V. 
Bogdanor, “Shouting ’Britain’: 29.  Compare the discussion in Parekh, B. The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 
(The Parekh Report), (London: Profile Books, 2000). 
66 See Iganski and Mason, Ethnicity, Equality of Opportunity and the British National Health Service. 
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